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Career Class (Im)mobility of the
Social-Cultural Specialists and the
Technocrats in the Netherlands
Ayse Gu¨veli and Nan Dirk De Graaf
Scholars have long argued that there are two occupational fractions within the middle
class forming two separate classes. They are commonly referred to as the technocrats and
the social-cultural specialists. In this article, we distinguish two ‘new’ classes of the high-
and low-grade social-cultural specialists and two ‘old’ classes of the high- and low-grade
technocrats within the middle class. The classes of the social-cultural specialists are
expected to be as closed as the other social classes. If the classes of the social-cultural
specialists indeed form ‘new’ classes, they should become more closed over time.
Therefore, we investigate whether the social-cultural specialists and the technocrats have
different patterns of intragenerational class (im)mobility compared to other classes and
whether these patterns change over time. We use Dutch mobility data from 16
representative surveys (n¼ 12,548). The results strongly support the ‘new’ class division and
show that the class of the high-grade social-cultural specialists are more closed than all
other social classes. The class of the lower-grade social-cultural specialists is also rather
closed and indeed becomes more closed over time.
Introduction
Since the 1970s, several scholars have claimed that the
middle class is no longer a single class, but forms two
social classes. These two classes are conceived in
different ways but in all cases implying a cleavage
within the middle class, whether between the ‘old’
versus the ‘new’ classes (Bruce-Biggs, 1979; Brint, 1984),
cultural elite versus economic elite (Bourdieu, 1984),
knowledge experts versus managers (Wright, 1985,
1997), or technocrats/controllers versus social-cultural
specialists (De Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Kriesi, 1989; Van
de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 2004). Inspired by new class
theories, Gu¨veli et al. (2005, 2007) have harmonized all
of these conceptualizations. They distinguished two
‘new’ classes of high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists and two ‘old’ classes of high- and low-grade
technocrats within the middle class. They claim
that social-cultural specialists are engendered by
post-industrial employment structures while techno-
crats originate from industrial employment structures
(De Graaf and Steijn, 1997; Kriesi, 1989; Ganzeboom
et al., 1987; De Graaf and Kalmijn, 1995). Several
scholars emphasized that the class distinctions can best
be conceptualized by their different positions on
outcome dimensions, such as political or moral
orientations and consumption styles. In a similar
vein, Gu¨veli et al. (2007) showed that the middle
class fractions differ in their political orientation, with
social-cultural specialists becoming more leftist since
the 1970s in the Netherlands. This study examines the
degree to which the middle class fractions display
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stable patterns of intragenerational (im)mobility
(Goldthorpe, 2000; Mayer and Carroll, 1987).
Patterns of intragenerational and intergenerational
class (im)mobility and collective behaviour of social
class members are classically used to outline social class
boundaries (Goldthorpe, 1980; Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992; Mayer and Carroll, 1987; Lipset,
1960, 1981; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Manza and Brooks,
1996). According to Weber (1978, 1922: 302),
‘‘‘a ‘‘social class’’ makes up the totality of those class
situations within which individual and generational
mobility is easy and typical’’’. With individual
mobility, Weber implies intragenerational or career
class mobility. Career class immobility is an indicator
for social cleavages within societies (Mayer and Carroll,
1987). If, for example, new social classes arise, these
classes should have manifest class boundaries before
they can be labelled as a class. A class boundary
ensures intra-class loyalty, and, to a certain extent, this
intra-class loyalty determines the collective social
action of its members.
This study focuses on the patterns of intragenera-
tional class mobility of the high- and low-grade social-
cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade
technocrats. The idea behind any class distinction
is that there is little interclass fluctuation within a
generation (Mayer and Carroll, 1987). The outflow and
inflow figures of an assumed social class should to
some extent be similar as the other more traditional
social classes to justify their distinction. If the newly
distinguished social classes are as closed as the
other social classes, the concept validity of these
social classes is, to a certain extent, justified regarding
their intragenerational class (im)mobility. To what
extent do the middle class fractions form stable
intragenerational class units? Our first research
question is: To what extent are the newly distinguished
social classes as closed as the other more traditional social
classes?
An arising class needs time to become a distinct
class and to gain a high degree of demographic identity
(Goldthorpe, 2000). The question is whether the ‘new’
classes of the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists have become more stable units over time.
Thus, the second research question is: To what
extent do the ‘new’ social classes, i.e. the high-grade
and low-grade social-cultural specialists, become more
closed over time? If the ‘new’ social classes become
more fixed over time and the ‘old’ classes do not, this
would be an important indicator that the ‘new’ social
classes become classes of their own.
Even though the service class of all post-industrial
societies has been growing since 1960s, the Netherlands
is one of these societies that has experienced a very
fast growth and has by now the largest service class
(Ganzeboom and Luijkx, 2004; Breen, 2004).
According to figures provided by Ganzeboom and
Luijkx (2004), the majority of the Dutch employed
male population (50 per cent) works in the service
class in 1999. Therefore, the Netherlands is an
interesting society to study the partition of the service
class. Consequently, to answer our questions, we use
Dutch mobility data. More specifically, we will
use mobility data from 16 different surveys collected
between 1982 and 2004. In the next section, we explain
the conceptualization of the fractions in the middle
class. In this section, we also set forth the theories of
social mobility specifically in relation to the assumed
class distinction and their class formation process over
time. Then, we discuss the data and the methods used
in the analysis. We present the findings and discuss the
conclusions in the last section.
Theory
Fractions Within the Middle Class
New class theorists have argued that there are new
social classes within the middle class and that these
classes should be separated into single classes.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the concep-
tualization of these fractions. Brint (1984), for
example, compared several conceptualizations to
explain the liberal attitudes of middle class members
and concluded that educational differences explain
most of the variations between the ‘new’ and ‘old’
classes. Lamont (1987), by contrast, considered cultural
capital workers as a new class claiming that their
common class interests explain their progressive
attitudes. These common interests are to maintain
and increase their autonomy, have a powerful govern-
ment sector, raise taxes from the private sector and
support politics regarding ‘non-material issues’ like
post-materialism, environmentalism, and the new left.
Esping-Andersen (1993) claimed that industrial
labour markets are transforming into post-industrial
labour markets and new class schemata should replace
the class schemata that are based on the industrial
division of labour. According to him, a differen-
tiation should be made between industrial versus
the post-industrial division of labour. Managers
within the middle class reflect an industrial logic
in the division of labour whereas professionals within
the middle class reveal the post-industrial logic
(Esping-Andersen, 1993: 13). Subsequently, he distin-
guished four post-industrial classes: (i) professionals
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and scientists, (ii) technicians and semi-professionals,
(iii) skilled service workers, and (iv) unskilled service
workers in his class schema.
Bourdieu (1984) made a distinction between
economic and cultural status hierarchies. He used
occupational position to differentiate between a
person’s economic and cultural status. He used
two different occupational ladders for these two
dimensions. Occupations with a low social status, like
unskilled workers, scored low on both ladders, specific
high social status occupations scored high on
the cultural ladder, and other high social status
occupations scored high on the economic ladder.
Occupations in education, health care and social
services, for example, are expected to score high on
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) and constitute the
‘new class’ of the post-industrial society (De Swaan,
1985). Occupations assumed to have a relatively high
economic dimension are those of the ‘old’ middle
class, like economists, engineers, managers, and
proprietors.
Kriesi (1989) also built on the ‘new’ class concept,
which he used to explain support for new
social movements in the Netherlands. He distinguished
two main classes, technocrats and social-cultural
specialists, claiming to have ‘a basic antagonism of
interest’ (Kriesi, 1989: 1081). Technocrats are supposed
to preserve the integrity of the organization they
work for, while social-cultural specialists are more
client-oriented or their objective is to act within the
body of knowledge of the discipline they belong.
The specialists are supposed to represent the ‘new’
class, and they are likely to support the new social
movements because ‘the specialists try to defend their
own and their clients’ relative autonomy’ against the
interventions of the technocratic controllers (Kriesi,
1989: 1085–86).
‘New’ Social Classes in the Middle Class:
Social Cultural Specialists Versus
Technocrats
Several scholars attempted to integrate these theories
into new class schemata. Inspired by new class theories,
changes in the employment structure, and especially,
the work of Kriesi (1989), De Graaf and Steijn (1997)
distinguished the social-cultural specialists from the
controllers within the middle class of the EGP class
schema, initially constructed by Erikson et al. (1979).
They showed that this distinction improves the
explanation of an array of attitudes and behaviours
substantially, even when controlling for education.
Furthermore, Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004)
showed that even the field of education of these
class members does not explain the differences in
political orientation of controllers and social-cultural
specialists. Gu¨veli et al. (2005, 2007) improved the
classification of De Graaf and Steijn (1997) by
implementing experts on labour and job markets. In
this article, we use this improved version of the
classification of the middle class, and provide an
additional validity test for this classification.
Inspired by new class theories, Gu¨veli et al. (2005,
2007) distinguished two occupational segments within
the middle class in order to account for the assumed
class cleavages. Technocrats and social-cultural specialists
were distinguished within the middle class according
to a combination of two criteria. The first criterion is
difficulty in monitoring the tasks performed by employ-
ees. They claimed that tasks performed by social-
cultural specialists are more difficult to monitor than
tasks performed by managers, administrators, and
technicians. The second criterion is the social and
cultural feature of occupations. This second criterion has
two components: a component of social services and
a component of social-cultural knowledge. Occupations
do not need to have both components to be classified
as social-cultural specialists: one is enough.
Gu¨veli et al. (2005, 2007) claimed that social-
cultural specialists are relatively difficult to control
due to their assets versus technocrats (Kriesi, 1989;
Friedson, 1986; Wanrooy, 2001). As Flood and Scott
(1978: 242) put it, ‘it is widely recognized that the
assessment of professional performance is at best a
complex and hazardous business.’ Freidson (1986: 152)
argued that there is a ‘basic antagonism of interest’
between managers and professionals. Managers seek to
prevent the interest and the viability of the organiza-
tion they work for while specialists try to prevent the
interest of their clients, patients or students and/or
their field of specialization. Generally, it is important
for specialists to guarantee autonomy in their work.
Therefore, they do not want their managers to interfere
in their domain of specialization. Flood and Scott
(1978) show that the influence of the managers on
the decisions of surgeons’ own domain was not
significantly related to the quality of surgical care.
On the other hand, a greater regulation of the work of
individual surgeons by the surgical staff was associated
with higher quality of surgical care in the hospitals.
Moreover, managers or employers do not have the
specialized knowledge that social-cultural specialists
possess at their disposal. These managers have a
classic Principal-Agent-problem (Coleman, 1990). The
principal (i.e. manager) is responsible for the agents,
but these agents have skills and knowledge the
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principal does not have. This makes it difficult for
the principal to control the agent. Managers, admin-
istrators, and technicians are relatively more concerned
with the conservation of the viability of the organiza-
tional unit they work for (Gu¨veli et al., 2005, 2007).
The social services provide the ‘quality of life’ in
societies such as in health, education, and services in
the public sector. Gu¨veli et al. (2005, 2007) based the
social and cultural feature of occupations within the
middle class on Bell’s (1971) thesis of the services
within post-industrial societies. According to Bell
(1971), the work tasks of the social-cultural specialists
are difficult to perform because professionals carrying
out these tasks face, on the one hand, increasing
demand for quality of service as a result of growing
wealth in post-industrial societies. On the other hand,
these occupations are not directly instrumental to
profit maximization. Innovations such as mechaniza-
tion and computerization can hardly make these
occupations more efficient (Baumol, 1967).
Theories on Class Boundaries and
Hypotheses
Theories about the importance of social mobility
for the class formation process are more concentrated
on intergenerational social mobility than on intragen-
erational class mobility (Mayer and Carroll, 1987).
However, we argue that intragenerational class
(im)mobility is at least as important as intergenera-
tional class mobility. Comparing people who are
mobile with those who are immobile could extend
our understanding of the relation between social
class and life chances and lifestyles. We specifically
concentrate on theories about social (im)mobility
within one generation, but we also use theories about
intergenerational (im)mobility in general. Marxist
theory, for example, claims that high rates of both
inter- and intragenerational social mobility contribute
to the transformation of the class structure and in
some cases, it causes the decomposition of social
classes (Marx, 1926). An opposite idea is that high
rates of social mobility do not necessarily undermine
the existence of social classes (Wright, 1979). The
existence of social classes is independent of social
mobility; a class is analogous to a hotel, ‘always full,
but always of different people’ (Schumpeter, 1953: 129;
Dahrendorf, 1969: 108). The latter argument is hard to
defend because when classes are very fluid, people will
anticipate later destination classes and they will not
behave in accordance with their current class position
(De Graaf et al., 1995). For example, if there is a high
degree of interclass mobility within a generation,
the relation between class position and vote will
never be strong.
Weber (1922) asserted that mobility could serve
as a criterion for determining class boundaries. On
the other hand, Goldthorpe (2000); Erikson and
Goldthorpe (1992) claimed that a class structure is
constituted by employment relations and not by social
mobility. In his 1980 book, Goldthorpe did not use
mobility to classify social class, but he asserted that
a low level of social mobility is crucial for class
stability. According to him, social immobility is, to
a certain extent, a precondition for class coherence.
If a class recruits from its own origin, it will improve
intra-class solidarity and will organize the class interest
of the incumbents. In case of a high level of interclass
fluctuation, it becomes more difficult for stable persons
to form a common class interest. For example, Ultee
and De Graaf (1991; De Graaf and Ultee, 1987)
claimed that if inflow to upper classes increases
substantially, it will be difficult for these classes to
uphold their norms with regard to highbrow culture.
Thus, we argue that a necessary condition for a social
class is that it needs to have a certain level of class
boundary.
Even though sociological theories about class mobility
do not make a clear statement regarding the influence of
intragenerational class mobility on the existence and
formation of social classes, it is straightforward that
frequent interclass fluctuations within a generation
undermines class stability. A class distinction requires a
certain degree of stability within a generation. According
to Mayer and Carroll (1987: 15), if intragenerational
inflow and outflow mobility figures are high, ‘then the
salience of an assumed class distinction might well be
questioned’.
The class structure conditions relative mobility
rates via the employment relations they comprise
(Goldthorpe, 2000). Employment relations are delin-
eated in terms of occupations. To enter a social class,
one needs to have the skills and capital needed for
those occupations the social class in question covers.
The high- and low-grade social-cultural specialists are
distinguished on the basis of employment relations
being difficult to monitor as well as performance of
their work tasks with social and cultural knowledge
and skills. Social-cultural specialists have more social
and cultural skills than other employed people whereas
technocrats possess more economic capital and skills.
The classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats are
expected to recruit more from other social classes than
the classes of the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists. The reason for this is that the skills and the
human capital technocrats need to perform their job
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well can be obtained, relatively more, through
on-the-job training than social-cultural specialists
(Savage et al., 1992: 132–58). For example, in the
beginning of their work career, people can enter a
lower social class and thereafter can climb easier to
the classes of high- and low-grade technocrats while it
is more difficult for these people to enter the classes
of high- and low-grade social-cultural specialists.
Social-cultural specialists, on the other hand, obtain
their class specific—social and cultural—skills early in
their formative years from their parents and education.
Subsequently, children with social and cultural skills
are positively sanctioned by their teachers who possess
the same kinds of skills (Bourdieu, 1984). They are
consequently more likely to enter the class of the
social-cultural specialists afterwards.
Social-cultural specialists are selected more on
the basis of their educational credentials to their jobs
than technocrats. In this respect, to become a member
of the class of social-cultural specialists, one has
to possess specialized knowledge on social and
cultural issues. In other words, there is a checkpoint
for entering the class of social-cultural specialists; this
is to a lesser extent the case in other social classes.
For example, a medical doctor, a teacher and a pastor,
who belong to the class of social-cultural specialists,
are only able to enter these occupations if they are
educated in these professions while a manager
and computer specialists can enter their occupation
without a specifically required field of education.
Members of the latter occupations specialize in their
profession more by on-the-job training than the
former ones. However, in the last decades, the other
social classes also increasingly require educational
credentials.
Career class mobility is substantially different
from intergenerational class mobility. That is to say,
once a member of a class, it is more difficult for a
person to move to another class in their lifetime than
it is to move to a class other than his/her father’s class.
The difficulty in moving to another class during one’s
lifetime stems from the difficulty in gaining the
qualifications needed to reach a specific social class
after the formative years of education. Particularly, we
expect that the inflow to and outflow from the class of
social-cultural specialists is more restricted than, for
example, the class of technocrats because of the specific
kind of qualifications the former class requires from
their members. Overall, our first expectation is that the
classes of the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists are more closed than the other traditional
social classes.
The post-industrial employment relations engender
its social class structure. The rise of social classes is a
gradual process. The ‘new’ social classes need time to
organize their class interest and to form a specific class
identity. According to Goldthorpe (1980), the class
formation process is primarily about the creation of
‘stable class collectivities’. However, there are two
effects operating in this process. On the one hand,
there is a class formation process of the ‘new’ social
classes, which we expect its effect tightens the
boundaries of the ‘new’ social classes, while, on the
other hand, there is a process of ‘professionalization,
bureaucratization and technical complexity in work’
affecting the (im)mobility of the ‘new’ social class
members. According to the ‘counterbalance’ thesis
(Goldthorpe, 1980), work-life career is becoming
increasingly difficult due to professionalization. While
the last process increases intergenerational mobility,
it decreases intragenerational mobility because access
to the middle and higher levels of the occupational
ladder is made increasingly dependent upon formal
education. Therefore, our second expectation is that
the classes of the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists become more closed over time than other
traditional social classes.
Data
The data, we use in this article allow us to test
our expectations about intragenerational (im)mobility,
i.e. career class (im)mobility. Intragenerational mobi-
lity is usually studied by analysing the mobility
between the first and last occupation (Blau and
Duncan, 1967; Goldthorpe, 1977, 1980; Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992; De Graaf and Luijkx, 1995;
Blossfeld, 1986). This is not a preferable method of
dealing with career class mobility since young persons
do not have enough time to change their classes.
According to the life-course thesis, career class
mobility is much more likely in the early working
life (Mayer and Carroll, 1987: 19). Therefore, we apply
a selection on age. We select people who are older than
39 years. The data used in this study enable us to make
this selection. Our dataset contains information about
the first occupation respondents had after finishing
their education and the last or current occupation.
We analyse (im)mobility between the class of first
occupation and the last or current class of occupation
over time.
We use data from 16 Dutch surveys that have been
collected between 1982 and 2003, which are a part
of the international stratification and mobility file
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(ISMF) project. The total number of respondents is
26,058. An overview of the data sources is given in
Appendix 1. Only people older than 39 years of age
who have a job or have had a job when they were 40
years of age or older are included in the analysis.
Including only people older than 39 years in the
analysis gives people enough time to switch from their
first class of occupation. After excluding the respon-
dents younger than 40 years, the total amount of
respondents included in the analysis is 10,448: 5,787
men and 4,661 women born between 1887 and 1963.
Operationalization
The operationalization of the fractions within the
middle class is fitted into the EGP class schema
(classes I and II) since this schema became a standard
indicator of class position in the international
mobility research (Erikson et al., 1979; Ganzeboom
et al., 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen,
2004). Occupations of the middle class fractions
were identified based on the four-digit occupational
classification of the International Standard Classification
of Occupations 1968 (ISCO). Gu¨veli et al. (2005, 2007)
distinguished social-cultural specialists from technocrats
within the middle class on the basis of a combination
of two criteria outlined in the previous section. They
used 12 experts who are specialists on job or labour
markets to allocate the occupations of the middle class
into the classes of technocrats and social-cultural
specialists according to their criteria. The reliability
coefficient (alpha coefficient for dichotomous data,
this is equivalent to the Kuder-Richardson 20) of the
experts’ allocation is 0.95; no expert disagreed strongly
with the other and overall reliability could not be
improved by leaving out experts (see for more detail
Gu¨veli et al., 2005, 2007). The coding scheme is
presented in Appendix 2 or it can be downloaded
from the website5http://www.ayseguveli.nl4.
To examine the intragenerational class immobility
of the newly distinguished social classes, the inflow
and outflow figures of these classes are compared
with the inflow and outflow figures of other more
traditional social classes. To do so, two variables
are constructed—a variable for the class of first
occupation and a variable for the class of last or
current occupation. Both variables contain two new
and six other more traditional social classes of the
EGP class schema. The categories of the variables of
the class of first occupation (the origin class) and
the class of last or current occupation (the destination
class) are presented in Figure 1. They are as follows:
(1) high-grade technocrats (Ia); (2) high-grade
social-cultural specialists (Ib); (3) low-grade
technocrats (IIa); (4) low-grade social-cultural
specialists (IIb); (5) routine non-manual workers
(III); (6) self-employed workers (IV); (7) skilled
manual workers (V/VI), and (8) semi and unskilled
manual workers (VII). The classes III, IV, V/VI, and
VII are identified by using the conversion tools
Figure 1 Variable codes, codes of the EGP class schema with two more newly distinguished classes (Ib and
IIb), class name and the occupations in the class of first occupation and the class of last/current occupation.
Variable code EGP code Class name Occupations
1 Ia High-grade technocrats Managers of big firms, governmental and non-
governmental administrators, physical scientists, etc.
2 Ib High-grade social-cultural
specialists
Medical doctors, dentists, university teachers,
social scientists high church officers, etc.
3 IIa Low-grade technocrats Managers of small firms, engineers,
computer programmers, etc.
4 IIb Low-grade social-cultural
specialists
Medical assistants, professional nurses,
teachers, artists, etc.
5 III Routine non-manual
employees
Routine non-manual employees in
administration and commerce, rank
and file service workers.
6 IV Self-employed persons Small proprietors with and
without employees, farmers.
7 V/VI Skilled manual workers Lower-grade technicians,
supervisors of manual workers,
skilled manuals.
8 VII Semi-unskilled manual
workers
Semi- and unskilled manual workers,
agricultural and other workers in primary production.
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from ISCO 68 to EGP class schema, which was
developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1989).
The (im)mobility between the first class and the
last or current class is controlled for level of
education because the education a person has affects
one’s work-life mobility (Pollaert et al. 1997). For
doing so, level of education is categorized into three
categories in terms of years of education people have
had. Using the years of education to categorize the
level of education could to some extent account for the
comparability of education over time. People who have
had at most 10 years of education are coded as having
a low education (1). People who have had 11–14 years
of education are coded as having a middle education
(2) and people who have had 15–21 years of education
are coded as having a high education (3). To test the
over time (im)mobility of the ‘new’ social classes, a
variable cohort is constructed. Respondents born
between 1887 and 1929 form the first (1) cohort.
Respondents born between 1930 and 1939 constitute
the second (2) cohort. Respondents born between 1940
and 1949 form the third (3) cohort and respondents
born between 1950 and 1963 constitute the fourth (4)
cohort.
Table 1 shows the percentage incumbents in the
last/current class of occupations over four birth
cohorts for men and women. A first impression
received from this table is that the share of incumbents
of all fractions within the middle class increased
over the four birth cohorts while the share of all
other classes decreased for men. The share of women
in these classes over the four birth cohorts shows
similar processes. Only the share of the routine non-
manual female employees increased over these cohorts;
whereas, it decreased for men. The proportion of men
in the class of the high-grade technocrats increased
slightly from 15 per cent in the first birth cohort
of 1887–1929 to 16 per cent in the last birth cohort of
1950–1963. The share of men in the class of the high-
grade social-cultural specialists also increased slightly
from 4 per cent in the first cohort to five per cent in
the last cohort. The share of men in the class of the
low-grade technocrats increased from 12 to 19 per cent
between the first and last birth cohorts. The share of
men in the class of the low-grade social-cultural
specialists tripled between the first cohort and last
cohort from five to 15 per cent. This table shows that
for men, the share of the upper middle class is higher
in the first cohort (15.4þ 3.9 per cent¼ 19.3 per cent)
than the share of the lower middle class (12.2þ 5.1
per cent¼ 17.3 per cent), while in the last cohort, the
share of the lower middle class exceeded the share of
the upper middle class. That is, the share of the
lower middle class became much higher (18.5þ 15.1
Table 1 Percentage incumbents in the last/current class of occupations over four birth cohorts for men and
women older than 39 year (Nmen¼5,787 and Nwomen¼ 4,661)
Birth Cohorts
Men
Social Classes 1887–1929 1930–1939 1940–1949 1950–1963
High-grade technocrats 15.4 16.4 14.8 15.7
High-grade social-cultural specialists 3.9 2.9 4.1 4.5
Low-grade technocrats 12.2 14.9 17.5 18.5
Low-grade social-cultural specialists 5.1 7.8 11.7 15.1
Routine non-manual employees 17.1 13.1 13.5 13.2
Self-employed persons 10.6 7.6 6.5 3.8
Skilled manual workers 18.0 20.3 18.6 15.7
Unskilled manual workers 17.7 17.0 13.6 13.5
Total N 997 1,504 1,999 1,679
Women
High-grade technocrats 2.1 2.0 3.5 3.7
High-grade social-cultural specialists 2.0 1.0 1.4 2.8
Low-grade technocrats 3.8 4.6 7.2 6.4
Low-grade social-cultural specialists 12.1 14.9 19.0 24.6
Routine non-manual employees 31.5 37.7 38.0 40.5
Self-employed persons 6.4 4.9 4.5 2.2
Skilled manual workers 6.0 4.4 3.3 2.5
Unskilled manual workers 36.1 30.5 23.1 17.4
Total N 654 1,143 1,745 1,480
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per cent¼ 33.6) than that of the upper middle class
(15.7þ 4.5 per cent¼ 20.2 per cent).
The proportion of women in both the classes of the
high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social-
cultural specialists increased slightly between the first
and last birth cohorts from 2 to four per cent and
from two to three per cent, respectively. The share of
women in the low-grade technocrats increased from
4 to 6 per cent between the first and last birth cohorts.
Table 1 shows that the proportion of women in the
class of the low-grade social-cultural specialists more
than doubled from 12 per cent in the first cohort to 25
per cent in the last cohort. These figures also show that
in the middle class women are overrepresented among
low-grade social-cultural specialists. However, among
the total female employed population, women are
overrepresented in the routine non-manual employees’
class in the last cohort. In the first birth cohort,
they were over represented in the class of unskilled
manual workers. Remarkable is the decline in the share
of female unskilled manual workers from 36 per cent
in the first birth cohort to 17 per cent in the last
birth cohort. In the next section, we elaborate on the
structural mobility between the first class of occupa-
tion and the last/current class of occupation and on
the patterns of relative (im)mobility.
Method
We start our analysis by showing some descriptive
figures about intragenerational class (im)mobility. The
inflow figures of social classes are shown in terms of
absolute mobility figures. The absolute mobility figures
are gross figures, e.g. without controlling for the
structural changes in the employment structure. Even
though absolute mobility rates give some information
about class stability, the relative rates or the odd ratios
are more important for delineating class boundaries.
To be able to reveal class openness (or closeness) of
the newly distinguished social classes, one should
control for structural changes. An example of struc-
tural changes is that, in the last decades of the 20th
century, the size of the classes of skilled and unskilled
manual workers have decreased while the size of the
middle class has increased. Log linear modelling is
an adequate method to control for these changes.
By using log linear modelling, one controls for changes
in the marginal distribution of rows and columns over
time. Therefore, we use these models to control
for structural changes and to reveal the stability of
the ‘new’ social classes. However, we also show the
absolute figures of social mobility to give an overview
of the effect of structural changes on immobility.
Subsequently, the cohort variable is included in the
models to find the class stability over time.
Results
Absolute Mobility for Men and Women
The absolute (im)mobility figures for men and women
are shown in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, the absolute
mobility for men between the class of first occupation
(origin class) and the class of last/current occupation
(destination class) is 46 per cent while 54 per cent are
stable1. This is in line with former findings (De Graaf
and Luijkx, 1995; Pollaerts et al. 1997) that most
people remain in their first social class. The column
marginals of the skilled and unskilled manual workers
are lower than their row marginals while the column
marginals of all other classes are higher than their row
marginals, which is an indication for structural
mobility. That is, the number of jobs in the destination
class of skilled manual and unskilled manual workers
decreased while in all other destination classes, the
number of jobs increased. Table 2 shows the inflow
percentages from the origin to the destination class for
men. The numbers in the main diagonal cells represent
stable males. It appears that 37 per cent of males are
upwardly mobile and 9 per cent downwardly mobile.
Intragenerational immobility is highest in the classes
of the high- and low-grade social-cultural specialists
and in the skilled and unskilled manual workers (61.9,
53.3, 67.1, and 59.3, respectively), while the classes
of the high- and low-grade technocrats (24.3 and 24.8,
respectively) show much less intragenerational stability.
Sixty-two per cent of the high-grade social-cultural
specialists had had the same first class of occupation
while more than half of the low-grade social-cultural
specialists in the last class of occupation (53.3 per
cent) are intragenerationally stable. The high-grade
social-cultural specialists are mostly recruited from the
low-grade social-cultural specialists (10.2 per cent) and
from the routine non-manual employees (10.8 per
cent), while the low-grade social-cultural specialists
are recruited more from the routine non-manual
employees (15.6 per cent) and the skilled manual
workers (13.7 per cent).
The high-grade technocrats recruit mostly from the
routine non-manual employees (22 per cent) and from
the skilled manual workers (15.4 per cent) and the
low-grade-technocrats (15.4 per cent) subsequently.
The low-grade technocrats recruit as much from the
routine non-manual employees (24.9 per cent) and
from the skilled manual workers (22.0 per cent) as
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Table 2 Intragenerational class mobility between the class of first occupation and the last/current class of occupation for men: inflow percentages
(N¼ 5,787)
Last/current class




















Ia. High technocrats 24.3 4.5 6.7 3.6 2.5 1.0 1.6 0.6 6.3
Ib. High social-cultural specialists 3.3 61.9 0.9 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.8
IIa. Low technocrats 15.4 2.3 24.8 4.9 5.4 3.8 2.3 1.8 9.0
IIb. Low social-cultural specialists 9.8 10.2 5.7 53.3 2.2 1.0 0.4 0.3 8.4
III. Routine non-manual employees 22.0 10.8 24.9 15.6 47.6 8.5 3.7 6.8 18.6
IV. Self employed persons 1.6 1.1 2.5 0.9 2.3 40.7 1.8 4.1 4.9
V/VI. Skilled manual workers 15.4 5.1 22.0 13.7 20.9 18.1 67.1 27.0 28.2
VII. Unskilled manual workers 8.3 4.0 12.6 6.5 18.9 26.6 23.1 59.3 21.9
N (918) (179) (1001) (553) (815) (398) (1052) (874) (5787)
Total 15.9 3.1 17.3 9.6 14.1 6.9 18.2 15.1 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3 Intragenerational class mobility between the class of first occupation and the last/current class of occupation for women: inflow percentages
(N¼ 4,661)
Last/current class






















Ia. High technocrats 25.0 3.1 1.9 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3
Ib. High social-cultural specialists 0.6 46.2 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
IIa. Low technocrats 7.7 4.6 37.5 2.8 2.2 1.6 0.6 0.8 4.5
IIb. Low social-cultural specialists 25.6 18.5 10.8 64.8 4.2 4.2 0.6 2.9 16.2
III. Routine non-manual employees 31.4 24.6 38.4 23.3 76.3 36.1 12.4 19.3 43.8
IV. Self employed persons 0.6 1.5 2.2 0.6 1.1 34.6 3.0 1.2 2.5
V/VI. Skilled manual workers 1.3 1.5 2.5 0.8 2.0 4.7 55.6 3.6 4.2
VII. Unskilled manual workers 7.7 0.0 6.3 6.2 13.9 18.8 27.8 71.9 26.5
N (156) (65) (315) (854) (1766) (191) (169) (1145) (4661)
Total 3.3 1.4 6.8 18.3 37.9 4.1 3.6 24.6 100.0




















from their own class of origin (24.8 per cent).
Furthermore, more than one out of five members of
all social classes, except the high-grade social-cultural
specialists, in destination class comes from classes
of skilled and unskilled manual workers. The high-
and low-grade social-cultural specialists recruit least
from the working class (skilled and unskilled
manual workers), 9.1 per cent (5.1þ 4 per cent) and
20.2 per cent (13.7þ 6.5 per cent), respectively.
These figures support our expectations that the high-
and low-grade technocrats are more intragenerationally
mobile than the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists.
Table 3 shows the inflow percentages from the
origin to the destination class for women. The absolute
work-life mobility between the origin class and the
destination class is 34 per cent while the absolute
work-life immobility comes to 66 per cent. It is
generally known that women, especially, in the past,
quit their job early in their work-life career and many
only worked part-time, which hinders their career
chances (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001; Hendrickx, et
al., 2001; Blossfeld and Hakim, 1997; Blossfeld, 1986).
This may explain the relative high work-life immobility
among women. The column and row marginals are
substantially different from each other implying
structural work-life mobility under female employees.
Jobs in the classes of routine non-manual employees,
skilled manual, and unskilled manual workers
decreased while jobs in all other classes increased.
Table 3 shows that among women, 21 per cent are
upwardly mobile while 11 per cent are downwardly
mobile. Comparing these figures of women to those of
men shows that women are substantially less upwardly
mobile (16 per cent) than men. However, there is
negligible difference with respect to their downward
career class mobility: 2 per cent of women are more
downwardly mobile than men. Furthermore, women
are over-represented in three social classes: routine
non-manual employees, unskilled manual workers, and
low-grade social-cultural specialists, respectively.
The high- and low-grade technocrats recruit more
from the routine non-manual employees than from
their own class of origin, 31.4 per cent and 38.4 per
cent, respectively. Mostly, women tend to start their
work-life career in routine non-manual jobs and
change their class during their work-life career.
Pollaerts et al. (1997) showed similar results by using
only a survey of our data set (the Family Survey of
Dutch Population 1992). The classes that recruit
relatively less from the routine non-manual employees
are the high-, low-grade social-cultural specialists,
and the skilled and unskilled manual workers.
Among the fractions of the middle class, women
are least employed in the high-grade social-cultural
specialist class (1.4 per cent), while they are
mostly employed in the low-grade social-cultural
specialist class (18.3 per cent). The high- and
low-grade social-cultural specialists are intragenera-
tionally more immobile than the high- and low-grade
technocrats. This is, on the basis of absolute mobility
figures, a support for our expectation. In the next
section, we take into account structural mobility and
focus on patterns of relative intragenerational
(im)mobility.
Log Linear Models for Men
We do not present log linear models for women,
since the mobility patterns of women show unstable
patterns2. The results of the log linear analysis of the
association between the origin class and the destination
class for men are presented in Table 4. To indicate the
fit of the models, we use the likelihood ratio (L2) and
the Bayesian Information Coefficient (BIC) (Raftery,
1986). Models 1–7 of Table 4 are based on the
assumption that the association between the origin and
the destination class does not change over cohorts, i.e.
between 1887 and 1963. The class career mobility over
cohorts is modelled in Models 8–11. With these
models, the hypothesis stating that the ‘new’ social
classes become more closed over time can be tested.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 show the model fits of log
Table 4 Loglinear model selection for intragenera-
tional class mobility for men (N¼ 5,742)
Models L2 df BIC
1. EFCþ ELCþ ECoþ
FCCoþ LCCo
3493.99 672 967.90
2. 1þD 1343.25 671 1179.08
3. 1þDi 1054.93 664 1441.09
4. 3þ SYM 469.09 636 1921.67
5. 3þU 596.07 663 1896.19
6. 3þRC 515.41 651 1931.74
7. 3þ E-RC 805.40 658 1668.06
8. 6þDCoL 515.22 650 1928.17
9. 6þDCo 509.90 647 1922.21
10. 6þDi CoL 500.49 643 1916.59
11. 6þDi Co 481.80 627 1845.06
E¼ level of education; FC¼ first class of occupation; LC¼ last/
current class of occupation; Co¼Cohort; CoL¼ cohort linear;
D¼ diagonal (class similarity) parameter; Di¼ differences among
diagonal cells; SYM¼ quasi-symmetry model; U¼ quasi-uniform
association model; RC¼ quasi-row-column effect model;
E-RC¼ quasi-equal-row and column effect model.
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linear models in terms of likelihood ratios and BIC
scores respectively.
Model 1 assumes that when controlling for cohort
and educational differences, there is no association
between the origin and destination class. This model
fits the data poorly. In Models–7, the pattern of
association is studied in more detail. First, we want to
find out whether there is an overrepresentation of men
who remain in the same class when controlling for
structural mobility. To test this tendency toward class
similarity, Model 2 contains a parameter (D) for the
main diagonal representing the general inheritance
parameter (Hout, 1983). That is to say, this model
tests the tendency of men to be socially stable within
one generation across social classes. Additionally,
Model 3 assumes that the strength of the tendency
toward class similarity differs among the origin and
destination class. The parameters Di in Model 3 show
the stability of all social classes within the adjusted
EGP class schema. Model 2 shows a strong improve-
ment of fit compared to Model 1 and the fit improves
substantially in the next step to Model 3. This
substantial improvement of the fit of Models 1 and 2
makes clear that the tendency toward intragenerational
class stability dominates the association strongly.
Next, the association in the off-diagonal cells of
the mobility table is analysed. Model 4 in Table 4 is a
quasi-symmetry model. This model assumes that the
inflow to the destination class and the outflow from
the origin class is symmetrical. The quasi-symmetry
model (Model 4) fits a separate parameter for each
off-diagonal cell of the table, with the only restric-
tion that the pattern of relative association must
be symmetrical. The fit of this model improves
substantially compared to Model 1, which means that
the mobility in this intragenerational mobility table
is symmetrical.
The quasi-symmetry model implies that mobility
is less likely as the distance between origin and
destination increases. Using association models, it is
possible to reveal whether there is a quasi-symmetric
pattern within this intragenerational mobility
table. Models–7 show these patterns. Model 5 is the
quasi-uniform association model and it assumes that
the barrier to climb up one class or to go down one
class is the same within the intragenerational mobility
table. Models 6 and 7 are the quasi-row-column-effects
models assuming that the association differs between
the classes of origin (first class of occupation) as well
as between the classes of destination (the last/current
class of occupation). Model 6 assumes the row and
column effects to be the same while Model 7 assumes
the row and column effects to be different. According
to BIC scores, Model 6 is the best model for these
samples, which means that mobility within this
intragenerational mobility table to be the same for
origin and destination classes.
Career Class Immobility Over Time
So far, the mobility patterns within the intragenerational
class mobility table are revealed, we continue the
analysis by examining the over time mobility patterns
in this table. The over time mobility models are based
on Model 6 since this model is the best model accord-
ing to the BIC scores. Model 8 assumes that the para-
meters for the differences in class stability among social
classes differ linearly across cohorts while Model 9
does so for each cohort. Model 10 assumes that the
strength of the tendency toward class stability differs
among social classes across cohorts linearly while
Model 11 assumes that the class stability of social
classes differs for each cohort. The improvement in the
fit of these models is lower than Model 6, but these
models fit the data significantly well according to the
likelihood ratio L2. We expect that the ‘new’ social
classes stabilize over time by recruiting more from
their own class of origin and therefore organize their
own class interest. That is to say, we are interested in
the linear trends of the strength of class stability
(immobility). Model 10 calculates these parameters.
Thus, our expectation is modelled in Model 10 and
the parameters Di C0L show this tendency toward
more (or less) closed ‘new’ social classes over cohorts.
The parameters Di and D

i C0L of this model are
shown in Table 5.
In Table 5, the logarithmic parameters Di and
Di C0L and the multiplicative versions of them are
presented. The parameters Di and D

i C0L are from
Model 10 shown in Table 4. Panel A of this table tests
our first hypothesis and Panel B tests our second
hypothesis. The parameters Di are the average
immobility scores. Since the multiplicative version of
these parameters is easier to understand, we discuss
them. The parameters for the differences in social class
stability among the origin and destination class show
that the high-grade social-cultural specialists have
the most clear-cut class boundary. The low-grade
social-cultural specialists are the third closed social
class while the class of self-employed persons is the
second closed social class. The class stability of the two
‘new’ social classes (the high- and low-grade social-
cultural specialists) and the class of the self-employed
persons are respectively 72.24, 8.33, and 13.59 times
higher than average. On the other hand, the most open
social class is the unskilled manual workers: it is 0.97
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times less closed than average. The high- and low-
grade technocrats are highly unstable classes. The
second and third most open social classes are the high-
and low-grade technocrats: they are respectively 1.51
and 2.77 times more closed than average. The immobi-
lity of the high-grade technocrats does not differ
significantly from the average immobile persons under
this model. Comparison of these classes makes clear
that our findings support the hypothesis stating that
the ‘new’ social classes are more closed than the other
traditional social classes of the EGP class schema.
The class of the low-grade technocrats is also signifi-
cantly more closed than the average. The class of the
high-grade technocrats is more closed than the average
but not significantly.
The logarithmic parameters Di C0L in Table 5 give
strength to the tendency toward class stability among
social classes across cohorts. Here too, we prefer
to interpret the multiplicative versions of these
logarithmic parameters. The low-grade social-cultural
specialists close 1.13 times their boundaries per cohort
than average. This supports the hypothesis that the
‘new’ social classes need time to consolidate
their career class mobility. However, the high-grade
social-cultural specialists do not show a significant
development toward a more stable class with regard to
career class mobility over cohorts. The sign of the
logarithmic parameter of the high-grade social-cultural
specialists is negative showing a decreasing stability of
this class over cohorts but this trend is not significant.
Given the very high level of closure of this class, it
seems that the class formation process of this class has
already ended in the Netherlands in the late 20th
century. Therefore, it is unlikely that the stability of
this class will increase further. The class boundary of
the skilled manual workers is closed 1.23 times more
per cohort than average while the class of the unskilled
manual workers open their class boundary 0.79
times more per cohort than average. None of the
parameters of the high- and low-grade technocrats
show a significant development of class closure across
cohorts. Consequently, the data support partly our
hypothesis stating that the ‘new’ social classes become
more closed over time.
Conclusions
In this study, we examined the intragenerational
(im)mobility patterns of the middle class fractions as
they were distinguished by Gu¨veli et al. (2005, 2007).
They subdivided the middle class into social-cultural
specialists and technocrats with both a higher and a
lower version. Our first hypothesis states that the
classes of the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists are more closed than the other social classes.
A social class without a clear-cut boundary cannot
organize its class interest, and therefore it is not
justifiable to consider this class a social class. The
second hypothesis states that if the new social classes
are rising, the class boundaries will become more
crystallized because new classes need time to organize
their class interest.
The data analysis strongly supports the hypothesis
that the ‘new’ social classes are more closed than
other traditional social classes. It turned out that the
high-grade social-cultural specialists have the most
clear-cut class boundary. The class of proprietors and
farmers (self-employed) have the second most clear-cut
class boundary, immediately followed by the low-grade
Table 5 Odds ratios (Exp(Di)) of the main diagonal of first class of occupation (origin class) and class of
occupation of 40 years of age (destination class) for men and trends in these odds ratios Exp(Di C0L)
Parameters of Model 10 from Table 4
Panel A Panel B
Social Classes Exp(Di) Exp(D

i C0L)
High-grade technocrats 1.51 1.01
High-grade social-cultural specialists 72.24* 0.73
Low-grade technocrats 2.77* 1.06
Low-grade social-cultural specialists 8.33* 1.13*
Routine non-manual employees 3.35* 1.02
Self-employed persons 13.59* 1.05
Skilled manual workers 4.66* 1.23*
Unskilled manual workers 0.97 0.79*
Di¼ differences among diagonal cells; CoL¼Cohort Linear. *p50.001.
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social-cultural specialists. The outstanding class bound-
aries of the high- and low-grade social-cultural
specialists may partly be attributed to the field of
education the members of the ‘new’ social classes
have.3 It could be attributed to the field of education
because one of the criteria of distinguishing the ‘new’
social classes is that ‘new’ class members’ work tasks
are based on specialized knowledge of social and
cultural issues. However, note that due to the other
criteria, not all people with specialized knowledge on
social and cultural issues belong to the class of social-
cultural specialists. Even though they have socially and
culturally specialized knowledge, employees within the
middle class who are relatively easy to control belong
to the class of technocrats. On the other hand,
educational credentials are also required in occupations
within the traditional classes such as in the classes of
the high- and low-grade technocrats. To become an
architect and an engineer, one also needs to be trained
in a fitting field of education. Nevertheless, we would
like to mention that the occupations within the classes
of the high- and low-grade social-cultural specialists
require educational credentials relatively more often
and more extensively than occupations in other classes.
Requiring educational credentials is not only a feature
of the field of education, but it is also a feature of the
type of occupation.
There is also support for the second hypothesis.
Even when controlling for the level of education,
the data show that the immobility of the low-grade
social-cultural specialists increases over time signifi-
cantly. This supports the idea that the low-grade
social-cultural specialists need time to consolidate their
class stability. Furthermore, the data do not show
a significant trend toward increasing immobility for
the high-grade social-cultural specialists. Since this
class is already the most closed class, it is unlikely
that its immobility increased even further. That is
to say, it is possible that this class had already
consolidated its stability, and therefore cannot increase
it further.
Furthermore, our data do not show that the
immobility increases significantly over cohorts for the
other classes, with the skilled manual workers as an
exception. On the other hand, the immobility of the
class of unskilled manual workers is decreasing and
this seems to be in contrast with the counterbalance
thesis. A question for further research is why the
immobility of the class of skilled manual workers is
increasing whereas the immobility of the class of
unskilled manual workers is decreasing?
All in all, our results support the subdivision of the
middle class. The middle class fractions differentiate
themselves by their clear-cut intragenerational mobility
boundaries. Why is intragenerational immobility of the
new classes important and what are the consequences
of our results? Intragenerational class (im)mobility is
important to reveal because of its implications on
people’s life chances and lifestyles. The impact of class
(im)mobility during the life course is an underexposed
subject. Sociologists have often investigated the influ-
ence of intergenerational (im)mobility on political
orientation (Barber, 1970; Clifford and Heath, 1993;
De Graaf and Ultee, 1990; De Graaf et al., 1995). In
our understanding, a way of investigating the net effect
of people’s own class on people’s life chances and
lifestyles is by comparing immobile with mobile
persons. This may help to understand the relationship
between one’s class position and one’s behaviour and
attitudes. It is generally known that social class
position has an effect on political preferences, educa-
tional outcomes, earnings, health and variety of other
outcomes (Lipset, 1960 [1981]; Marshall et al. 1988;
Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Kriesi, 1989; Goldthorpe, 2000;
Heath and Clifford, 1990; Wright, 1985; Bourdieu,
1984). However, the theoretical reasoning of these
effects is not explicated satisfactorily (Breen and
Rottman, 1995), except for political preferences.
Maybe in the future, we will gain more insight as to
why social classes differ in outcomes by comparing
intragenerationally immobile class members with those
of mobile class members.
Notes
1. Calculation of the percentage of immobile persons
within Table 2 is, to sum up the immobile persons
of all classes (Ia, Ib, IIa, IIb, III, IV, V/VI, VII) and
divide this by the total amount of persons. We can
take the percentage of immobile persons from the
absolute totals of the columns to find the absolute
number of immobile persons (persons in the main
diagonal cells). For example, the absolute immobile
high technocrats are 24.3 per cent of 918. Those
are 223 persons. We do this for all main diagonal
cells. That is: 223þ 109þ 248þ 295þ 388þ 162þ
706þ 518¼ 2649/5787¼ 0.46. The percentage of
mobile persons is then 1.00.46¼ 0.54.
2. We analysed the log linear models for women
separately. None of the log linear models for
women show a reasonable fit with the data. The
reason for this may be that the intragenerational
mobility table for women contain many zero-cells.
Therefore, we exclude women from further
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analysis. The log linear models are available on
request for interested readers.
3. We are aware that one can reveal a part of the
relation of why the new classes are more closed than
other classes by including the field of education or
the labour market segments in the model. However,
only a small part of our data contains this
information. Using only this part of the data results
in many null-cells in our tables and our models
become unstable. Therefore, we prefer to use the
complete data set and not to include the field of
education and the labour market segments in our
analyses.
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Appendix 1 Data Source for men and women in the labour force in the Netherlands 1982–2003
Nr AKRO ABBREVIATED STUDY TITLE Men (N) Women (N)
net82n National Labour Market Survey, 1982 1,335 1,342
net82u National Prestige and Mobility Survey, 1982 497 256
net87i Cultural Change [ISSP] 1987 934 1,056
net91j Justice of Income Survey 1991 [ISJP] 950 833
net92f Netherlands Family Survey I, 11992-93 902 898
net94h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1994 440 595
net95h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1995 1,019 1,014
net95y Subsample Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1995 680 641
net96 Social Inequality in the Netherlands, 1996 412 378
net96c National Crime Study, 1996 813 1065
net96y Subsample National Crime Study, 1996 355 435
net98 Social and Economic Attitudes, 1998 542 391
net98f Netherlands Family Survey II, 1998 1,000 1,029
net99 Use of Information Technology, 1999 1,431 1,080
net00 Netherlands Family Survey III, 2000 779 782
net04 Netherlands Family Survey IV, 2003 1,063 1,111
Total 13,152 12,906
See for more information:5http://www.scw.vu.nl/ganzeboom/ismf4.
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Appendix 2
The ISCO 1968 codes of the occupations of four
classes within the service class
Ia. High-grade technocrats (0100 0110 0120 0130
0131 0132 0133 0139 0200 0210 0220 0230 0240 0250
0260 0270 0280 0290 0409 0400 0410 0411 0419 0420
0429 0430 0500 0510 0520 0521 0529 0530 0531
0539 0670 0800 0810 0820 0900 1100 1101 1109 1200
1211 1220 1221 1222 1229 1290 1394 2000 2010 2011
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
2024 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2039
2111 2114 2115 2119 2192 2193 2194 2195 2197 5822
5831).
Ib. High-grade social-cultural specialists (0600 0610
0611 0619 0630 0650 1210 1219 1299 1310 1311 1319
1392 1411 1740 1951 1960 1900 1920 1921 1922 1923
1924 1929).
IIa. Low-grade technocrats (0140 0300 0310 0320
0329 0330 0339 0340 0350 0360 0370 0380 0390 0421
0540 0541 0549 0620 0660 0680 0751 0770 0791 0793
0830 0840 0849 1291 1511 1622 1629 1630 1631 1790
1800 1992 1993 1994 1995 1999 2112 2113 2116 2120
2190 2191 2196 2199 3009 3100 3101 3102 3103 3104
3109 3500 3510 3520 4000 4001 4002 4009 4200 4210
4220 4221 4222 4229 4300 4310 4319 4400 4410 4411
4412 4419 4420 4430 4431 4432 4439 5000 5001 5002
5009 5100 5101 5102 5103 5104 5109 5823).
IIb. Low-grade social-cultural specialists (0640 0690
0700 0710 0711 0715 0719 0730 0740 0750 0759 0760
0761 0769 0780 0790 0792 0799 1300 1320 1321 1329
1330 1340 1350 1390 1391 1399 1400 1410 1412 1413
1414 1415 1416 1419 1490 1499 1500 1510 1519 1590
1591 1592 1593 1599 1600 1610 1620 1621 1639 1700
1710 1711 1712 1713 1719 1720 1721 1729 1730 1731
1732 1739 1749 1750 1791 1799 1801 1809 1910 1930
1931 1939 1940 1941 1949 1950 1959 1990 1991 5820
5821 5829).
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